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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN MISSISSIPPI 1982 TO 1995:
A PRACTICAL TOOL FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES'
Richard Smith-Monahan
I. Introduction
The State of Mississippi has long enjoyed immunity from liability for its tor-
tious acts through a judicially created common law rule and through a series of
complicated legislative enactments. Sovereign immunity was derived from the
English concept that the King could do no wrong, and it relieved the state and its
political subdivisions from amenability for harm done to its citizens.' The doc-
trine of sovereign immunity first appeared in Mississippi in the mid-nineteenth
century in cases such as County of Yalabusha v. Carbry3 and Anderson v. State.4
After its original recognition, sovereign immunity remained intact as a common
law doctrine in Mississippi for almost a century and a half.
Over the course of the past decade, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has
undergone such complex changes in both the Mississippi Supreme Court and the
Mississippi Legislature that it has become a difficult task for both lawyers and
judges to determine when sovereign immunity will or will not apply. Further,
even when the doctrine is applicable, the determination of whether the immunity
derives from a legislative or judicial source is often unclear, and thus lawyers
face confusion in deciding what procedural requirements must be followed in
both bringing a claim against the government and in asserting the immunity as a
defense. This Comment focuses first on the changes in the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from 1982 to the present, discussing ambiguities in both statutory lan-
guage and the opinions of the Mississippi Supreme Court. Second, the Comment
examines the present state of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and how it may
apply to suits brought against the State of Mississippi or its political subdivi-
sions, depending on the time the causes of action accrue. Finally, the Comment
briefly analyzes potential constitutional challenges to sovereign immunity as it
stands in Mississippi today.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: 1982 TO 1995
Judicially created sovereign immunity in Mississippi endured for approximate-
ly 140 years before finally being abrogated by the Mississippi Supreme Court in
1982 in Pruett v. City of Rosedale.' The court held that "the absolute sovereign
immunity doctrine is out of date in modem society and modem legal concepts"
1: This Comment focuses on the immunity of the State of Mississippi and its political subdivisions for
.torts. Qualified good faith immunity enjoyed by public officials in their individual capacity is not addressed.
2. Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So. 2d 1046, 1047 (Miss. 1982).
3. 11 Miss. 529 (1844).
4. 23 Miss. 459 (1852).
5. 421 So. 2d 1046 (Miss. 1982).
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and abolished all judicially created immunity for the State of Mississippi and its
political subdivisions.8 Justice Bowling, writing for the court, expressed the pol-
icy that any supervision or control over a person's right to bring suit against the
sovereign should be handled by the legislature and not the court.7 The court
made its holding prospective only and delayed its application until July 1, 1984,
thus giving the Mississippi Legislature an opportunity to act.8
The Mississippi Legislature responded to the Pruett decision in 1984 by enact-
ing a comprehensive sovereign immunity statute.' The provisions of the statute,
however, were not to take effect until July of 1985. Until that time, section
11-46-6" provided that the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it
existed prior to the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Pruett, was to be
applied by the Mississippi courts. The section stated:
This act shall apply only to claims that accrue on or after July 1, 1985, as to the
state, and on or after October 1, 1985, as to political subdivisions. Claims that
accrue prior to July 1, 1985, as to the state or, prior to October 1, 1985, as to
political subdivisions, shall not be affected by this act but shall continue to be
governed by the case law governing sovereign immunity as it existed immedi-
ately prior to the decision in the case of Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So. 2d
1046, and by the statutory law governing sovereign immunity existing prior to
July 1, 1985.11
Instead of allowing the Act to take force the following July, however, the
Mississippi Legislature reenacted the Act in 1985 and postponed the effective
date of the comprehensive statute until July of 1986.12 The Mississippi
Legislature repeated this same process in each of the succeeding years through
1992, maintaining the pre-Pruett law on the issue of sovereign immunity. 3
In 1992, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Presley v. Mississippi State
Highway Commission 14 held that section 11-46-6 was unconstitutional because it
violated the doctrine of separation of powers as well as Article 4, Section 61 of
the Mississippi Constitution." Four justices went on to hold that the court's
opinion was only to apply prospectively.18 Thus, all cases arising prior to Presley
were to still be governed by section 11-46-6 and the law as it existed before
6. Id. at 1047.
7. Id. at 1051.
8. Id. at 1052.
9. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1 to -23 (Supp. 1984).
10. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-6 was included in Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-7 as an editor's note until 1987.
Hereinafter both will be refered to and cited as § 11-46-6.
11. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-6 (Supp. 1984).
12. MiSS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-6 (Supp. 1985).
13. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-6 (See supplements for this statute for the consecutive years 1986-1992).
14. 608 So. 2d 1288 (Miss. 1992).
15. Id. at 1294-98. The Mississippi Constitution provides: "No law shall be revived or amended by refer-
ence to its title only, but the section or sections, as amended or revived, shall be inserted at length." Miss.
CONST. art. IV, § 61.
16. Presley, 608 So. 2dat 1298-1301.
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Pruett. Three justices dissented to this portion of the opinion, however, conclud-
ing that the holding should also apply retroactively. 7 The remaining two justices
dissented and stated that section 11-46-6 was not unconstitutional at all.' 8 The
two dissenters provided no specific intimation as to prospective or retroactive
application of the plurality's holding.
Thus, the plurality's ruling in Presley left two very important questions unan-
swered. The first issue was whether Presley would apply prospectively or
retroactively. The second inquiry was, since pre-Pruett sovereign immunity
would no longer be applied to causes of action arising after Presley, what would
be the law on sovereign immunity?
A. Prospective or Retroactive Application of Presley
The Mississippi Supreme Court's first indication of Presley ' applicability
came in the court's opinion in Churchill v. Pearl River Basin Development
District.9 In Churchill, the plaintiff's injury had accrued on August 1, 1981 -
before the court had delivered its opinion in Pruett.2" Thus, the common law on
sovereign immunity which existed before Pruett clearly governed the case.
Justice McRae writing for the court went on, however, to discuss Presley and the
retroactive application of its holding.2' Justice McRae stated that the only por-
tion of Presley which had precedential value was the ruling that section 11-46-6
was unconstitutional.22 Since there was no majority vote on the issue of retroac-
tivity, Justice McRae opined that the issue had not been conclusively
determined.2"
Later in 1993, Justice Prather adopted Justice McRae's reasoning in Morgan v.
City of Ruleville.24 In Morgan, the City of Ruleville's purported negligence
occurred on May 30, 1987.25 As of that date, section 11-46-6 required the pre-
Pruett law to be applied concerning the city's sovereign immunity and Presley
had not yet been decided. The Mississippi Supreme Court considered at length
its decisions in Presley and Churchill and concluded that Presley had no prece-
dential value on the issue of its own retroactivity.26 The court then held, without
further discussion, that section 11-46-6 applied to the case and that pre-Pruett
law governed. 7 Thus, although the court did not state so emphatically, it
appeared to have answered the question: Presley is not to be applied retroactively.
17. Id. at 1301-10 (McRae, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. Id. at 1310-11 (Lee, J., dissenting).
19. 619 So. 2d 900 (Miss. 1993).




24. 627 So. 2d 275 (Miss. 1993).
25. Id. at 276-77.
26. Id. at 278.
27. Id. at 278-79.
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The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed its holding in Morgan, again without
any explanation, in Coplin v. Francis.28 In Coplin, the plaintiff's cause of action
against the county accrued on September 20, 1985.29 This date was after enact-
ment of section 11-46-6 but before the court's opinion in Presley. The court con-
cluded in one sentence that the county enjoyed sovereign immunity on the date
of the plaintiff's injury." Therefore, the implication of Morgan and Coplin is
that Presley's holding is prospective only and section 11-46-6 applies to causes
of action which arose prior to Presley.
This is the interpretation adopted by the federal district courts construing
Mississippi sovereign immunity law. In Newsom v. Stanciel,3' the district court
held that Presley had no application to cases which arose prior to its mandate,
and thus section 11-46-6 governed.32 Likewise, in Wesley v. Mississippi
Transportation Commission,3" the district court applied pre-Pruett law on sover-
eign immunity to a claim against the State of Mississippi which accrued on
April 4, 1991 - before the Presley decision.
3 4
B. Sovereign Immunity After Presley
Presley was decided on August 31, 1992, 3 and immediately following, in a
special session, the Mississippi Legislature responded by amending certain sec-
tions of the comprehensive sovereign immunity statute to make the provisions
effective as of September 16, 1992.36 The 1992 Special Session amendments
performed three important functions for the Mississippi Legislature: (1) section
11-46-3 of the comprehensive sovereign immunity statute was made immediately
effective, thus providing governmental entities with immunity against suit;37
(2) section 11-46-6, which had been declared unconstitutional by the court in
Presley, was repealed; 38 and (3) governmental entities were given the discre-
tionary authority to purchase liability insurance which, if purchased, would
waive the government's immunity up to the amount of coverage.39
28. 631 So. 2d 752 (Miss. 1994).
29. Id. at 755.
30. Id.
31. 850 E Supp. 507 (N.D. Miss. 1994).
32. Id. at 515.
33. 857 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
34. Id. at 530.
35. Presley v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 608 So. 2d 1288 (Miss. 1992).
36. Act of Sept. 16, 1992, ch. 3, §§ 1-5, 1992 Miss. Laws 4 (currently codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-
3 (Supp. 1995) (amendedApril 1, 1993), § 11-46-6 (Supp. 1995), § 11-46-16 (Supp. 1995), § 71-3-5 (1995)) (§
5 set the effective date of the Act and therefore is codified at Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-46-6, 11-46-16, and 71-3-
5, which have not been amended since September 16, 1992).
37. Act of Sept. 16, 1992, ch. 3, § 1, 1992 Miss. Laws 4 (currently codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-3
(Supp. 1995) (amended April 1, 1993)).
38. Act of Sept. 16, 1992, ch. 3, § 2, 1992 Miss. Laws 4 (currently codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-6
(Supp. 1995)).
39. Act of Sept. 16, 1992, ch. 3, § 3, 1992 Miss. Laws 4 (currently codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-16
(Supp. 1995)).
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In the regular session in 1993, the Mississippi Legislature enacted the entire
comprehensive sovereign immunity statute which had been on the books for the
previous nine years.4 The statute became effective on April 1, 1993, but many
of the provisions did not take effect until October 1, 1993.41 The statute remains
in force as of the time of this Comment.42
III. THE EFFECTS OF TIME OF ACCRUAL ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
As discussed above, the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Mississippi derived
from a mix of legislative and judicial decisions. Although the basic concept of
immunity of the sovereign has remained constant, the source from which the
immunity stems has potentially important substantive effects. Further, the source
of the immunity may alter the procedural requirements for making a claim
against the state or one of its political subdivisions. These differences hinge on
the time the plaintiff's suit accrues. The following section examines these varia-
tions.
A. Pre-Presley Causes ofAction
Morgan and Coplin imply that all causes of action which arose prior to Presley
are governed by the law on sovereign immunity as it existed prior to Pruett.
43
Thus, all causes of action which accrued before August 31, 1992, are governed
by judicially created sovereign immunity as it has traditionally existed.
Morgan v. City of Ruleville44 provides a thorough summary of sovereign
immunity at common law. Whether or not the state or one of its political subdi-
visions enjoys immunity for tortious conduct depends upon whether the entity
was engaged in a "governmental" or a "proprietary" function at the time of the
plaintiff's injury.45 The distinction between the two types of functions is essential
because the entity is immune if performing a governmental function and enjoys
no immunity if performing a proprietary function.46
The difference between governmental and proprietary functions is unclear and
leaves a lot of room for creative argument. The court in Morgan suggested that
governmental functions are those which an entity " 'is required by state law to
engage in and to perform.' ""' The court listed specific actions which have been
found governmental:
[T]he decision whether to place traffic control devices at an intersection; estab-
lishment and regulation of schools, hospitals, poorhouses, fire departments,
40. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-46-1 to -23 (Supp. 1993).
41. Id.
42. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-46-1 to-23 (Supp. 1993).
43. 'See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
44. 627 So. 2d 275 (Miss. 1993).
45. Id. at 279 (citing Webb v. Jackson, 583 So. 2d 946, 952 (Miss. 1991)).
46. Id. (citing Webb, 583 So. 2d at 952; White v. City of Tupelo, 462 So. 2d 707, 708 (Miss. 1984);
Nathaniel v. City of Moss Point, 385 So. 2d 599, 601 (Miss. 1980)).
47. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth., 419 So. 2d 1010, 1014-15 (Miss. 1982)).
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police departments, jails, workhouses, and police stations; the adoption and
enforcement of ordinances and regulations for the prevention of the destruction
of property by fire and flood, and the manner and the character of the construc-
tion of the buildings.48
Proprietary functions, often called "corporate" functions, are those which are
" 'not required or imposed ... by law,' " but are activities which the governmen-
tal entity " 'is free to perform or not.' "" "Proprietary activities are those which,
while beneficial to the community and very important, are not vital to a [govern-
mental entity's] functioning."' These functions include:
The operation of a city garbage dump; the construction and maintenance of
sewage outlets to and from buildings; the maintenance and repairing of streets;
the construction and maintenance of sidewalks; the operation and management
of an electrical power plant by a municipality; the construction of a nuisance,
such as a hog pond, close to the plaintiff's residence; the operation by the city of
a fair, baseball park, or football stadium; the operation of a fire hydrant; the
hauling of dirt and trash by the city; the operation and maintenance of a zoo; the
creation of a dangerous situation regarding trees near sidewalks, streets or neu-
tral areas; the operation of river landings for ingress and egress by boats; the
construction and maintenance of a bridge over a gulley or ditch near a sidewalk
or street; the construction and maintenance of a drain to provide for controlling
rainfall; the offensive odors from a negligently operated sewage system; the
supervision of the construction of a wall of a building not owned by the city; the
overhead traffic control signal lights and stop signs at intersection."
In sum, if the State of Mississippi or its political subdivision is performing a
governmental, as opposed to a proprietary, function the entity enjoys sovereign
immunity for torts committed by the entity or its employees. 2 If sovereign
immunity exists for a governmental entity, a plaintiff may still be entitled to
recover if the entity has purchased liability insurance which covers the type of
injury the plaintiff has suffered.5" In Churchill v. Pearl River Basin Development
District,54 the Mississippi Supreme Court waived a governmental entity's sover-
eign immunity up to the amount that the entity is covered by liability insurance. 5
If a plaintiff brings a suit against a governmental entity relying on the fact that
the entity has insurance, the plaintiff should be aware of dicta in Morgan v. City
ofRuleville 6 which suggests that the Mississippi Municipal Liability Plan (here-
inafter M.M.L.P.) is not insurance which waives sovereign immunity. 7 In
Morgan, the court found that the City of Ruleville was performing a proprietary
48. Id. at 279 n.2 (quoting Anderson, 419 So. 2d at 1014 n.1).
49. Id. at 279 (quoting Anderson, 419 So. 2d at 1014).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 279 n.3 (quoting Anderson, 419 So. 2d at 1014-15 n.2).
52. Id. at 279.
53. Id. at 280.
54. 619 So. 2d 900 (Miss. 1993).
55. Id. at 906.
56. 627 So. 2d 275 (Miss. 1993).
57. Id. at 281.
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function in operating a public pool. 8 Accordingly, the city did not enjoy sover-
eign immunity for its purported negligent operation of the pool. 9 Justice Prather
went on, however, to address the issue of whether the M.M.L.P. would have
waived sovereign immunity had the city been immune in the case.6" Justice
Prather, with four other justices concurring, concluded that the M.M.L.P. was
self-insurance which would not waive sovereign immunity.6" Thus, although the
portion of the opinion on the M.M.L.P. is only dicta, it is a strong indication that
the M.M.L.P. will not get a plaintiff around sovereign immunity. In fact, in
Newsom v. Stanciel62 a federal district court relied on Morgan in holding that the
M.M.L.P. was not insurance which waived sovereign immunity for the City of
Greenwood.63
B. Post-Presley Causes ofAction
There are three separate time periods after Presley in which causes of action
may accrue: (1) the period after Presley but before the 1992 Special Session
amendments were passed; (2) the period after the 1992 Special Session amend-
ments but before the entire comprehensive statute was enacted in 1993; and
(3) the period after the 1993 comprehensive sovereign immunity statute was
enacted. Differences in sovereign immunity law depend upon the time period
during which the cause of action accrued. Each of the three periods are dis-
cussed below.
1. Post Presley/Pre- 1992 Special Session
Presley was decided on August 31, 199264 and the 1992 Special Session
amendments did not go into force until September 16, 1992.65 Thus, technically
speaking, for approximately fifteen days, Pruett was the law, and the State of
Mississippi and its political subdivisions had no sovereign immunity. This is
because Presley had declared section 11-46-6 unconstitutional, and the 1992
comprehensive sovereign immunity statute was not to go into force until 1993.66
Accordingly, a plaintiff who was negligently injured by the State of Mississippi
or one of its political subdivisions on September 1-15, 1992, may claim that
since no statute was in force granting sovereign immunity during that time,
Pruett ' abrogation of sovereign immunity applies and the governmental entity is
completely amenable to suit.
58. Id. at 279.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 280-81.
61. Id. at 281.
62. 850 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Miss. 1994).
63. Id. at 515.
64. Presley v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 608 So. 2d 1288 (Miss. 1992).
65. Act of Sept. 16, 1992, ch. 3, §§ 1-5, 1992 Miss. Laws 4 (currently codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-
3 (Supp. 1995) (amended April 1, 1993), § 11-46-6 (Supp. 1995), § 11-46-16 (Supp. 1995), § 71-3-5 (1995)) (§
5 set the effective date of the Act and therefore is codified at Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-46-6, 11-46-16, and 71-3-
5, which have not been amended since September 16, 1992).
66. See Presley, 608 So. 2d at 1288; MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-46-1 to -23 (Supp. 1992).
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2. Post- 1992 Special Session/Pre- 1993 Comprehensive Statute
From September 16, 1992, until April 1, 1993, the 1992 Special Session
amendments were in force. 7 The 1992 Special Session amendments work essen-
tially the same as judicially created sovereign immunity. Section 1 of the 1992
Special Session amendments provides immunity to the State of Mississippi and
all of its political subdivisions but does not allow a municipality the protection of
immunity when it performs a proprietary function.' Further, section 3 waives
sovereign immunity up to the amount of liability insurance purchased by the
governmental entity. 9 Thus, for a plaintiff whose cause of action accrued
September 16, 1992, to March 31, 1993, the sovereign immunity defense works
against her or him as it did at common law, prior to Presley.
3. Post-1993 Comprehensive Statute
The 1993 comprehensive statute effects two time periods differently as to sov-
ereign immunity. The first period began on April 3, 1993, and ran until
September 30, 1993.70 Section .11-46-3 is the general immunity provision, and
the language of section 11-46-3 essentially tracks the language of section 1 of the
1992 Special Session amendments.71 Both sections provide the same immunity
for the State of Mississippi and its political subdivisions.7 Further, section
11-46-16 provides the same waiver of immunity for liability insurance as section
3 of the !992 Special Session amendments.73
The additions provided by the 1993 statute during this first period are proce-
dural. Section 11-46-7 makes the comprehensive statute the exclusive remedy
against the governmental entity. 4 Thus, any plaintiff bringing an action against
the State of Mississippi or its political subdivisions must meet the procedural fil-
ing requirements of section 11-46-11.7 These requirements are simple to meet,
but it is important to follow them or the plaintiff's claim may be barred.
76
The second time period began on October 1, 1993, and is presently in effect.77
Two important changes in the comprehensive statute occur during this second
67. See Act of September 16, 1992, ch. 3, §§ 1-5, Miss. Laws 4 (currently codified at Miss. CODE ANN. §
11-46-3 (Supp. 1995) (amended April 1, 1993), § 11-46-6 (Supp. 1995), § 11-46-16 (Supp. 1995), § 71-3-5,
(1995)) (§ 5 set the effective date of the Act and therefore is codified at Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-46-6, 11-46-16,
and 71-3-5, which have not been amended since September 16, 1992); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-46-1 to -23
(Supp. 1993).
68. Act of Sept. 16,1992, ch. 3, § 1, 1992 Miss. Laws 4 (currently codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-3
(Supp. 1995) (amendedApril 1, 1993)).
69. Act of Sept. 16, 1992, ch. 3, § 3, 1992 Miss. Laws 4 (currently codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-16
(Supp. 1995)).
70. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-3 (Supp. 1993).
71. See id. Compare with Act of Sept. 16, 1992, ch. 3, § 1, 1992 Miss. Laws 4.
72. Id.
73. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-16 (Supp. 1993). Compare with Act of Sept. 16, 1992, ch. 3, § 3, 1992
Miss. Laws 4.
74. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-7 (Supp. 1993).
75. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-11 (Supp. 1993).
76. Id.
77. MIss. CODFANN. § 11-46-3 (Supp. 1993).
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time period. The first is a change in the general grant of sovereign immunity in
section 11-46-3 for the State of Mississippi and its political subdivisions. The
same grant of immunity is given to governmental entities except that the section
which waived immunity for municipalities performing proprietary functions was
removed.78 Thus, if a plaintiff's claim against the governmental entity arose on
or after October 1, 1993, the legislature has made the entity immune from suit
even if it was performing a proprietary function.79
The second change is that as of July 1, 1993, for the State of Mississippi, and
October 1, 1993, for the political subdivisions, section 11-46-5 provides a waiver
of sovereign immunity for governmental entities.8" Section 11-46-15 provides
that the waiver of immunity is limited to $50,000.00 until July 1, 1997, at which
time the limit increases to $250,000.00.81 For claims arising after July 1, 2001,
the limit is $500,000.00.2
In order to cover the liability of section 11-46-15, the Mississippi Legislature
created the Tort Claims Fund.83 Section 11-46-17 requires that governmental
entities either contribute to the Tort Claims Fund or obtain insurance to cover the
potential liabilities.84 Further, section 11-46-17 provides that if any governmen-
tal entity has liability insurance in excess of the limits provided in section 11-46-15,
sovereign immunity is waived up to the amount of such excess insurance.8"
Thus, the result is that if a plaintiff has a claim which accrued on or after July
1, 1993, against the state, or on or after October 1, 1993, against a political sub-
division, the entity will have sovereign immunity regardless of whether the activ-
ity is governmental or proprietary in nature. 8 The immunity will be waived,
however, up to the amounts provided in section 11-46-15 in addition to any
excess liability insurance carried by the entity.8 Further, the plaintiff must
remember that section 11-46-11 provides filing requirements which must be
met.8
IV CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The recent sovereign immunity statutes have several potential constitutional
defects. For a plaintiff whose claim accrued while the 1992 Special Session
amendments were in force, the plaintiff might try to challenge the section provid-
ing for discretionary purchase of insurance. Section 3 of the 1992 Special
Session amendments provides that government entities have the discretion to
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-5 (Supp. 1993).
81. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-15 (Supp. 1993).
82. Id.
83. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-17 (Supp. 1993).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-3 (Supp. 1993).
87. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-46-5, -15, -17 (Supp. 1993).
88. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-11 (Supp. 1993).
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purchase liability insurance and, if they do so, sovereign immunity is waived up
to the amount of coverage.89 The effect of the section is that the plaintiff who has
been injured by the governmental entity will have access to redress in a court of
law if the entity, in its discretion, has purchased liability insurance, but will be
deprived of any remedy if the entity has no liability insurance.
The plaintiff may argue that this provision violates the plaintiff's right to equal
protection of the laws as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment." The claimant
who is injured by a governmental entity that has no liability insurance has no
right to redress, while the plaintiff who is injured by a governmental entity that
has liability insurance does have a right to some redress. No legitimate govern-
mental objective is served by treating these two classes of plaintiffs differently
based on whether the governmental entity, in its own discretion, saw fit to pur-
chase an insurance plan.
The plaintiff may also argue that the provision violates the plaintiff's right to
due process as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 Whether or not a
claimant has a right to redress against a governmental entity depends entirely
upon whether the entity purchased liability insurance. This determination is
wholly within the entity's discretion. Hence, the plaintiff's right to redress is left
to the discretion of each individual governmental entity. The entity has no incen-
tive to purchase the insurance since, when it is uninsured, it is otherwise entirely
immune from suit.
The Mississippi Constitution, article III, section 24, guarantees an individual
the right to redress for wrongs done to her or him.92 The section provides: "All
courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and jus-
tice shall be administered, without sale, denial, or delay."93 The section allows all
plaintiffs an action for wrongs against them, regardless of whether the wrongs
are public or private.94 The plaintiff may argue that there is no rational basis for
placing a plaintiff's constitutional right to recovery in the hands of each govern-
mental entity, especially when the entity has no incentive whatsoever to protect
the plaintiff's right. The same argument applies to the arbitrary cap placed on
the plaintiff's recovery based on the amount of coverage in the particular insur-
ance policy that the entity chose.
Plaintiffs whose causes of action accrued after the 1993 comprehensive statute
was enacted may likewise challenge the insurance provisions in section
11-46-17.9 Further, the plaintiff may challenge section 11-46-15 which limits
the plaintiff's recovery to a certain amount depending upon the time the
89. Act of Sept. 16, 1992, ch. 3, § 3, 1992 Miss. Laws 4 (currently codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-16
(Supp. 1995)).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
91. Id.
92. Miss. CONST. art. III, § 24.
93. Id.
94. Id. See also Presley v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 608 So. 2d 1288, 1302-03 (Miss. 1992)
(McRae, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was eviscerated with the adoption
of article III, section 24, in 1890).
95. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-17 (Supp. 1993).
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plaintiff's cause of action accrues.9" As with the cap on recovery based on insur-
ance, the plaintiff may argue that section 11-46-15 arbitrarily limits the plaintiff's
redress to an amount which is totally inadequate to compensate for the plaintiff's
losses in violation of the plaintiff's due process rights. Also, the plaintiff may
contend that section 11-46-15 violates the plaintiff's right to equal protection by,
for example, denying any recovery at all to a plaintiff whose injury occurred
prior to October 1, 1993, while allowing redress up to $50,000.00 for a plaintiff
whose cause of action accrued after October 1, 1993.97
No cases have yet arisen in the Mississippi Supreme Court challenging the
constitutionality of the latest sovereign immunity statutes. Since the court in
Presley struck down section 11-46-6 of the 1992 sovereign immunity statute as
unconstitutional,9 8 the Mississippi Legislature has made some significant
changes in the way the sovereign immunity defense applies to persons injured by
a governmental entity. As shown above, many of these changes treat claimants
unfairly and may be ripe for constitutional challenge. The legislature's latest
attempt to immunize municipalities for proprietary or corporate functions99 may
itself be struck down as a violation of a plaintiff's due process rights considering
the pervasiveness of the government's actions in modem times.
As Chief Justice Smith wrote for the Mississippi Supreme Court in Albritton
v. City of Winona,"' the Due Process Clause must be interpreted "under the
social and economic conditions then existing, which conditions are ever chang-
ing and each case must be decided on the social and economic conditions that
exist when the statute was enacted or, probably, at the time the case is decid-
ed."1" 1 "Growth is the life of the law, and when it ceases to grow and to keep
pace with the social and economic needs it becomes a hindrance instead of an aid
to the public welfare.""1 2 Sovereign immunity itself, especially when applied to
proprietary functions, is out of step with our modern post-New Deal ideology
that the government be involved in all aspects of an individual's life.
V CONCLUSION
A plaintiff who has been injured by a tort committed by the State of
Mississippi or one of its political subdivisions has several important considera-
tions to keep in mind when deciding whether or not to file a suit. First is the
time the plaintiff's cause of action accrued. This can make important differences
in how the sovereign immunity law applies and any procedural requirements that
must be met in filing the action. The plaintiff should also consider whether the
governmental entity was performing a governmental or a proprietary function
96. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-15 (Supp. 1993).
97. See id.
98. Presley, 608 So. 2d at 1288.
99. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-3 (Supp. 1993).
100. 178 So. 799 (Miss. 1938).
101. Id. at 806.
102. Id.
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when it injured the plaintiff. If the activity was of a private nature no immunity
will exist for the entity.
Further, the plaintiff should determine whether the governmental entity carried
liability insurance that covered the injury the plaintiff suffered. Regardless of
when the cause of action accrued, liability insurance always waives sovereign
immunity up to the amount of the coverage. If the accident occurred after mid-
1993, sovereign immunity will be waived up to a minimal amount specified in
the statute." 3 Finally, the plaintiff may want to break new ground and challenge
provisions of the sovereign immunity statute on constitutional grounds. In our
modern day and age, not only does the government perform a tremendously wide
range of functions, but it employs such a large number of individuals that the
possibility of harm to the public is enormous. Statutory provisions which pro-
hibit or limit a plaintiff's access to a court of law to seek compensation for
injuries caused by a governmental entity fail to recognize modem economic real-
ities. Governmental entities should no longer constitutionally be permitted to
harm persons and have their liability limited to an insignificant amount or have
their liability depend upon whether they, in their own discretion, chose to buy lia-
bility insurance.
103. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-15 (Supp. 1993).
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